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COMMENTS
A review of these Washington cases will reveal that the only
class of cases, outlined above, directly passesd upon in Washington
is the Dominion type of case; that there is an indirect holding on
the treasury stock situation; that flagrant fraud will not be tolerated; and that the promoter owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation. Unfortunately, by an explicit statement, numerous dicta, and
a direct holding in the Gold Ridge case, Washington seems lined up
with the Lewisohn case. But since the cases as a whole contain
little elaboration and discussion, especially of the conflicting policies and interests involved, it is hoped that the Washington court
will allow this question to be reopened, with the consequent result
of a turning over to the more desirable Massachusetts, Bigelow view.
MAUtiC Gxasnox.

NEGLICOMPETENCY OF PROOF OF "CUSTOMARY"
GENCE IN SUPPORT OF CHARGE OF SPECIFIC
ACT OF NEGLIGENCE
It is no doubt accurate to say that the bar of this state has heretofore assumed (and justifiably so, in view of prior decisions of
the court) that, generally speaking, a specific charge of negligence
(e.g. excessive speed) may not be established by proof of prior
or similar acts of negligence, nor even by proof of customary or
habitual negligence of the same sort. Consequently, the opinion of
the Washington Supreme Court in Sheddy v. Inland Motor
Freight,' is of more than passing interest.
The case involved a head-on collision between the automobile in
which the plaintiff was riding and a truck owned and operated by
the defendant. Negligence was predicated, among other things,
upon an allegation of excessive speed. As corroborative of plaintiff's own direct testimony on the noint, he offered testimony to
the effect that defendant's fleet of trucks was engaged in transporting steel from the railroad at Coulee City to the dam; that
the steel was hauled on a tonnage basis, and that the compensation
of defendant's drivers depended, in part, at least, upon the mileage
which each made; that approximately five loads were transported
each day, and that "more or less of a schedule had to be maintained on each trip, in order to obtain efficient results" for the
defendant and for its drivers.
Evidence was also offered as to the speed capacity of the truck
in question, the time "regularly" required to drive the truck, loaded as it was on this occasion, "from terminus to terminus, or from
junction to junction, and the nature of the road as to curves
grades and straight-aways."
All of this testimony ivas admitted by the trial court, and in
affirming the judgment, the Washington Supreme Court found the
evidence relevant and competent as "creating a background fro 5
which the inference could be drawn that, on a straight-away with
a down grade, a speed of fifty miles per hour or thereabouts would
be customary", and that the testimony "tended rather strongly to
189 Wash. Dec. 41, 68 P. (2d) 430 (1936).
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corroborate the respondent's [plaintiff's] theory that at the time
and place of the accident, the truck was travelling at from fortyfive to fifty miles per hour."
The significance of the Court's reasoning, however, is considerably weakened by the following statement in the Court's opinion:
"The case of Chilberg v. Parsons, 109 Wash. 90, 186
Pac. 272, and others, to the effect that, to support a particular charge of negligence, it is not competent to show
that the person charged is habitually careless and negligent, are not in point here. The testimony complained of
was properly admitted."
The Court's approval of the admission of circumstantial evidence from which "customary" excessive speed may be inferred
certainly justifies the conclusion that direct testimony of "customary" excessive speed would be at least equally relevant and
competent. Consequently, it is suggested that in this brief discussion we may start with the assumption that the language quoted
indicates the admissibility of direct evidence of "customary" excessive speed in proof of a charge of excessive speed on the particular occasion.
The Court's statement that its prior decisions excluding evidence
that the party charged was "habitually careless and negligent"
are not in point, is hardly understandable. We are justified in assuming that the Court does not intend to draw a significant distinction between "customary" negligence and "habitual" negligence. No doubt in the present situation the terms are, for practical
purposes, synonymous. Wigmore apparently regards them as such.'
If there is a distinction, it perhaps suggests that "habit" more
nearly approaches invariability than does "custom". All of which
seems to justify the assertion that if prior decisions of the court
exclude "habit" evidence in negligence cases, "custom" evidence
also should be excluded.
Before attempting a brief analysis of prior local decisions on
the point, it is proper to observe that a good bit of this evidence
was, no doubt, admissible on a more direct basis. For example, the
fact that this particular truck on this trip was behind its schedule,
the condition of the roadway, and the anount of the load of the
truck, would seem relevant enough as establishing a basis, particularly in connection with the other evidence in the case, for a direct
inference to excessive speed at the time and place of the accident.
What we are here concerned with, however, is the court's reasoning in justifying the admission of this evidence as affording the
basis of an inference to "customary" excessive speed, and thence
to excessive speed in the particular case. As already indicated, this
seems to plainly suggest the admissibility, as a general rule, of
direct evidence of "customary" excessive speed.
Chronologically, the history of the problem in this jurisdiction
is about as follows:
In Christensen v. Union Trunk Line,3 in support of a charge
of excessive speed of a street car, plaintiff was permitted to show
(2d ed., 1923) §§ 92, 375.
'6 Wash. 75, 32 Pac. 1018 (1893).
21 WIGM ORE, EVIDENCE

COMMENTS
that the particular motorman "had run his car at a high rate of
speed upon other occasions." The court held the evidence should
have been excluded as irrelevant, and upon the basis of unfair
surprise.
In Carter v. Seattle,4 defendant's evidence indicated that the
plaintiff was drunk at the time of the accident. In support of his
denial, plaintiff, in rebuttal, introduced three witnesses who were
permitted to testify to his "general reputation and character for
sobriety." The Court held the admission of this evidence error on
the ground of confusion of issues, and further stated that "The
general and well settled rule in negligence cases is that it is not
proper for a plaintiff, in order to rebut evidence of particular
acts of negligence, to show that he is generally careful, cautious
and prudent; nor can it be shown that a party is habitually careless to show a claim of negligence upon a particular occasion."
Atherton v. Tacoma Railway & Power Company5 meets even more
directly the language of the Court in the case under consideration.
There, on an issue of excessive speed of a street car, plaintiff
offered to show "that the customary rate of speed of the said cars
on Pacific Avenue was greater than the limit prescribed by the
ordinance and a high and dangerous rate." Holding that such
testimony has only "slight relevancy to the issue" and tends to
divert the attention of the jury to extraneous matters, and citing
Christensen, the Court approved the exclusion.
Poler v. PolerO was a divorce action in which the defendant was
"directly and specifically charged" with an act of sodomy, to meet
which he offered evidence of his general reputation as a-law abiding, moral man. The offered evidence was held properly excluded as
"not an issue in the case."
Kangley v. Rogers" involved an alleged act of negligence on
the part of a notary public. The defendant offered evidence that he
"was ordinarily careful in taking acknowledgments."
Citing
Carter,the Court held the exclusion of this evidence was proper,
because "the act complained of was a specified act in which no
question of probability entered * * *.The overwhelming weight of
authorities excludes evidence of character offered for the purpose
of raising an inference of conduct in actions charging negligent
acts. "
Chilberg v. Parsons8 referred to in the Sheddy case, was a
negligence case growing out of the collision of two automobiles,
the defendant charging in his cross-complaint not only that the
planitiff's son, who was driving the plaintiff's automobile at the
time, was negligent in certain specified particulars, but also that
the plaintiff himself was negligent "in permitting his car to be
driven by his son, who was * * * an incompetent driver and habitually negligent in his operation of such vehicles." In support of this
allegation, the trial court admitted testimony of a motorcycle
policeman offered by the defendant as to the customary speed at
'19 Wash. 597, 53 Pac. 1102 (1898).
130 Wash. 395, 71 Pac. 39 (1902).
'32 Wash. 400, 73 Pac. 372 (1903).
'185 Wash. 250, 147 Pac. 898 (1915).
'109 Wash. 90, 186 Pac. 272 (1919).
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which the plaintiff's son drove. Notwithstanding the charge of
incompetence in the cross-complaint, the Court, citing Carter and
Kangley, held the admission of the evidence error, approving the
rule of the prior cases as a salutary one, "tending to promote
justice, and that any departure therefrom would invite the trial
of cases on collateral issues * * * "

Bossier v. Payne9 involved a grade crossing accident, and on
the issue of contributory negligence, plaintiff offered evidence
tending to show that it was the "general custom and habit" of the
deceased to stop and look for approaching trains when at the
gate, and again to look just before crossing the track. Citing
Christensen, Carter, Atherton, Kangley and Chilberg, the Court
held the exclusion of the evidence proper, saying, "It is not competent for a party, in order to rebut evidence of negligence on a
particular occasion, to show that he is generally careful, cautious
and prudent"; and that it is likewise "not competent, in order to
support a claim of negligence on the particular occasion, to show
that the party is habitually careless and negligent." 10
Brooks v. Herd" was a malpractice case in which the Court held
it error to admit evidence tending to show negligence on the part
of the defendant in the treatment of plaintiff's brother for the
same disease.
The foregoing decisions are apparently in line with the weight
of authority.12 Plainly, they exclude evidence of "habitual" or
"customary" negligence, whether the evidence is direct in character, or consists of proof of prior instances.
It is thus clear enough that they are pertinent to the Court's
interpretation of the evidence in the Sheddy case, and consequently the action of the Court in brushing them aside without explanation is confusing.
On the other hand, there are at least three decisions of the Washington court which apparently approve the admission of habit
evidence in cases of this character.
In Allard v. Northwestern Contract Company,'3 on the question
of plaintiff's contributory negligence in failing to get under cover
after warning of an impending blast, the trial court excluded evidence that on previous occasions plaintiff had failed to get under
1125 Wash. 155, 215 Pac. 366 (1923).

'"Reference to the briefs in this case discloses that plaintiff strongly
relied upon the rule obtaining in some jurisdictions [(1922) 16 ILL. L.
R y. 628; (1916) 14 MieH. L. R.v. 411; (1916) 64 U. of PA. L. REV.
403], notably in California, admitting evidence of the careful habits
of the deceased where there are no eye witnesses, and cited to the court
particularly Wallis v. Southern Pacific Co., 184 Cal. 662, 195 Pac. 408
(1921). The opinion in Rossier v. Payne did not take note of this contention. While approving this rule, the Wallis case went much further,
holding the habit evidence admissible, regardless of whether there were
eye witnesses. This broad language has apparently since been repudiated
[Starr v. Los Angeles R. Co., 187 Cal. 270, 201 Pac. 599 (1921)], although
the rule still obtains in California that the evidence is admissible where
there are no eye witnesses.
"144 Wash. 173, 257 Pac. 238 (1927).
"WiJoRE, EVIDENCe, 1934 Supp., § 97; Annotations, (1921) 15 A.
L. R. 125, (1922) 18 A. L. R. 1106.
"64 Wash. 14, 116 Pac. 457 (1911).
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cover when blasts were fired, after warning, and that plaintiff
had grown careless in this respect. The exclusion was held erroneous on appeal, the court saying that, "If the respondent [plaintiff]
had, on different occasions theretofore, remained in an exposed
position while the blast was being fired, after having received
warning thereof, it afforded some ground for belief that such might
have been his conduct on this occasion." The Court attempted to
distinguish Christensen and Atherton, but
the basis of the distinc4
tion, if there is any, is not substantial.1
In Jaquith v. Worden, 5 one of the issues was whether or not defendant Murphy personally left his automobile in the street in an
unlighted condition. Evidence was admitted tending to show that
Murphy habitually stood his unlighted car in the street in front
of his house after dark. Without reference to prior local decisions,
the Court held the testimony was admissible "as a circumstance
tending to prove that he personally left the car there on the night
in question.'"'6
In Bown v. Tacoma,'7 upon an issue-as to how the plaintiff got
upon the rear bumper of a truck (plaintiff claimed he was struck
by the backing truck and thrown on the bumper, while the defendant claimed that the plaintiff voluntarily climbed on the
bumper), evidence was admitted in behalf of the defendant as to
the boy's habit of riding on the bumpers of automobiles in the
alley where the accident happened, and in adjoining streets. The
Court held it was not error to admit the testimony, citing Allard
(but no other case), and saying that, "On the issue of contributory
negligence, while the boy's actions were not to be measured by the
same rule that would be applied to adults, it was proper to show
his habit in relation to cars, to be weighed by the jury under proper
instructions"'
It is suggested that it is impossible to reconcile the Allard,
Jaquith and Bown cases with those previously referred to. And
now the Sheddy case adds to the confusion.
There is no doubt something to be said for the admission of
habit evidence in cases of this sort. Generally, says Wigmore, there
can be no doubt "of the probative value of a person's habit or
custom, as showing the doing on a specific occasion of an act
which is the subject of the habit or custom. Every day's experience
and reasoning makes it clear enough."' 8
And with particular reference to negligence eases, it is his
view that, theoretically, "There is no reason why such a habit
should not be used as evidential-either a habit of negligent action, or a habit of careful action.'"" It is consequently his view
that the doubts expressed in the precedents excluding habit evi"'In Rossier v. Payne, supra, plaintiff cited and strongly relied upon

the Allard case, but it was not referred to in the court's opinion.

"173 Wash. 349, 132 Pac. 33 (1913).
21It should be noted, however, that the evidence was held admissible
upon another and somewhat more tenable ground.
1175 Wash. 414, 27 P. (2d) 711 (1933).
211

WIGMORE, EVDENCE (2d ed., 1923)

"Id. § 97.

§ 92.
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dence are not well founded,
and that such evidence often has sub20
stantial probative value.
Of course, if we mean by "habit" an invariable course of conduct, 21 it is apparent that habit evidence possesses substantial probative value--certainly, so understood, it is more than "slightly"
relevant, or, to apply Wigmore's test, it22possesses "something more
than a minimum of probative value."
But, as Wigmore observes, "In the ordinary affairs of life, a
habit or custom seldom has such an invariable regularity. Hence,
it is easy to see why, in a given instance, something that may be
loosely called habit or custom should be rejected, because it may
not, in fact, have sufficient regularity to make it probable that
it would be carried out in every instance, or in most instances." 23
Moreover, as suggested in some of the cases, "Is it possible to
believe that careless action can ever be anything more than casual
or occasional? If it is, are we not really predicating a careless disposition, rather than a genuine habit, and then are we not violating
the rule 24against character in civil cases in employing such evidence?"1
In any event, conceding the relevancy, that is to say, the substantial probative value of evidence of this sort, considerations of
undue prejudice, unfair surprise, and confusion of issues unquestionably represent potent and persuasive objections to departure
from the rule of the prior excluding decisions, at least in so far as
such a relaxation
would operate to admit proof of prior specific
25
instances.

The opinion in the Sheddy case rather indicates that the Court
is flirting with the idea of relaxing the rule of most of the earlier
decisions. Yet, in the absence of a more extended reference to these
prior decisions, and a bolder statement of the Court's purpose, we
suspect that this last pronouncement had better be taken cum
grano salis.
JuDsox F. FALKNOR.Y

20Ibid.

'Such is the "fixed method and systematic operation of the Government's Postal Service", which has "'been long conceded to be evidence
of the due delivery to the addressee of mail matter placed for that purpose in the custody of the authorities." The same principle has been

recognized in admitting the usual course of business of a private person
or commercial house to evidence the sending of a notice or the mailing
of a letter. 1 W IGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d. ed., 1923) § 95.
"1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed., 1923) § 28.
id., 92. Suppose plaintiff was injured in an accident which occurred
on Saturday night, and defendant is contending that plaintiff was drunk
at the time of the accident. Evidence offered by the defendant that
plaintiff is an "habitual" drunkard should probably be excluded under
Wigmore's reasoning, because here we are using the word "habit" somewhat loosely, that is to say, even an "habitual" drunkard is sober a good
part of the time. But suppose the offered evidence showed that the plaintiff, over a period of years, habitually, that is invariably, got drunk on
Saturday nights. Such evidence would have substantial probative value.
"1 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed., 1923) § 97.
5
w § 199.
1d.,
*Dean and Professor of Law, University of Washington Law School.

